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Social role theory posits that occupational gender roles give rise to gender differences
in behavior, such that men and women engage in qualitatively different prosocial
behaviors. Therefore, we expected that women who observed an unfair situation
(involving a victim and a perpetrator) would respond by demonstrating communal
prosocial behavior (by compensating the victim), whereas men would respond with
agentic prosocial behavior (by punishing the perpetrator). Furthermore, on the basis
of social role theory, we expected that gender differences would be more pro-
nounced in countries with a more unequal distribution of men and women in commu-
nal and agentic occupational roles. The current research tested the predictions using
an economic game. Two studies consisting of samples from 10 countries (Study
1, N = 1,791) and a student sample from Germany (Study 2, N = 193) showed no sup-
port for the predicted gender differences in prosocial behavior and no systematic
relationship between prosocial behavior and gender roles across countries.
K E YWORD S
agentic, communal, gender differences, helping, prosocial behavior, social role theory
1 | INTRODUCTION
Prosocial behavior is associated with helping, sharing, comforting, res-
cuing, and defending another individual, but it can also involve
supporting the collective, group, or nation (Eagly, 2009). Previous
research shows that men and women differ in the degree to which
they engage in prosocial behavior. However, the direction of this
gender difference is less clear. For instance, some research demon-
strates that females are more prosocial than males (e.g., Carlo, Roesch,
Knight, & Koller, 2001; Russell, Hart, Robinson, & Olsen, 2003; see
also the meta-analysis by Fabes & Eisenberg, 1998), whereas other
studies have shown that males are more prosocial than females
(e.g., Eagly & Crowley, 1986). In the present research, we investigate
whether women and men exhibit different kinds of prosocial behavior.
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1.1 | Gender differences in prosocial behavior
We argue that there is no simple answer to the question of which
gender is more prosocial. Instead, on the basis of social role theory,
we argue that men and women engage in different kinds of prosocial
behavior (Eagly, 2009). According to the theory, behavioral gender dif-
ferences are driven by an unequal distribution of men and women in
different social roles (e.g., Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000), which
shape expectations regarding gender-typed behavior. Across the
world, women more frequently occupy communal, caring-oriented
social roles, whereas men more frequently occupy agentic,
achievement-oriented social roles (Kan, Sullivan, & Gershuny, 2011).
When observing men and women in these roles, people infer that
they have specific traits (i.e., communal traits on the part of women
vs. agentic traits on the part of men) that qualify them for these roles.
As men and women are internally motivated to meet these expecta-
tions (Greenwald et al., 2002) and avoid backlash for engaging in gen-
der stereotype-incongruent behavior, men are more likely to engage
in agentic (prosocial) behaviors (e.g., behavior that can increase the
status of the helper), whereas women are more likely to engage in
communal (prosocial) behaviors (e.g., empathy-related behavior;
Eagly, 2009).
1.1.1 | Gender differences using social psychological
paradigms
To investigate this assumption, Eagly (2009) reviewed research on
gender differences in prosocial behavior in a range of social situations
that involved interacting with strangers, romantic partners, family
members, and work colleagues and concluded that men and women
are not more or less prosocial. Instead, Eagly noted that women seem
more likely to engage in communal (i.e., relational, friendly, compas-
sionate, and comforting) prosocial behaviors, whereas men seem more
likely to engage in agentic (i.e., dominant, assertive, aggressive, and
risky) prosocial behaviors. For example, women show more prosocial
behavior in dyadic relationships: they are more likely to empathize
and engage in self-disclosure than men (e.g., Rose & Rudolph, 2006)
and are more likely to provide emotional support in marriages (Neff &
Karney, 2005). Men, on the other hand, are more likely to offer help
to strangers (Johnson et al., 1989) and to help in the presence of
others (e.g., De Caroli & Sagone, 2013).
1.1.2 | Gender differences using economic
paradigms
Reviewing the economic game literature, which uses money transfers
as a measure of prosocial behavior, results in the same conclusion;
that is, a more differentiated perspective on gender differences is nec-
essary. Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, and Van Vugt (2011) conducted a meta-
analysis of 272 effect sizes for gender differences in the amount men
and women transferred to an interaction partner. They found no
overall gender differences but concluded that gender differences in
prosocial (transfer) behavior were game and context dependent.
Indeed, a closer look into the literature reveals that gender differences
in economic game behavior seem to hinge on a specific game feature:
Women usually act more prosocially in games requiring an altruistic
motive for transfer behavior, whereas men transfer more money to
their interaction partners when the game involves an element of risk.
For example, in dictator games, in which the player assigned to be
a “dictator” can decide whether they wish to selflessly share their
experimental endowment with a passive player, women often trans-
fer more money to the interaction partner than men do (e.g., Eckel
& Grossman, 1998; Engel, 2011). However, in economic games
(e.g., trust games, Romano, Balliet, Yamagishi, & Liu, 2017;
prisoner's dilemma games, Dorrough & Glöckner, 2019) that involve
the risk of exploitation (where the player transfers money and the
interaction partner does not), men typically transfer more money to
interaction partners than women do (for an overview regarding the
different motives in economic games, see Thielmann, Böhm, &
Hilbig, 2015).
In sum, previous research using social psychological as well as
economic paradigms suggests that men and women are not more or
less prosocial but rather prosocial in different ways. The assertion that
men and women engage in different kinds of prosocial behavior
(in line with gender role expectations), however, has only been
inferred from comparing results between studies using different
research designs (Eagly, 2009). A direct experimental test of this
assertion within one study is still missing. The current project aims to
fill this gap to get a better understanding of gender differences in
prosocial behavior and to bring findings from previous research
together. Taken together, based on the theoretical and empirical con-
siderations above, it can be predicted that men are more likely to
engage in agentic forms of prosocial behavior, whereas women are
more likely to engage in communal forms of prosocial behavior.
1.1.3 | Gender differences in prosocial behavior
across countries
In addition to investigating whether men and women engage in differ-
ent kinds of prosocial behavior, our research also tests whether gen-
der differences in prosocial behavior vary between countries.
According to social role theory, observing men and women in differ-
ent (occupational) roles shapes gender stereotypes, which, when
internalized, gives rise to gender differences in behavior in the direc-
tion of the stereotype (e.g., Eagly & Wood, 2012). As countries differ
in occupational gender segregation, we should observe larger gender
differences in behavior in countries with more occupational gender
segregation (Eagly & Wood, 1999). Previous cross-national research
on mating preferences and gender equality supports this assumption:
Gender differences in preferences for stereotype-congruent partners
were less pronounced in countries that ranked high (rather than low)
on a gender equality index (Eagly & Wood, 1999). In line with social
role theory and previous findings, it can be predicted that gender
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differences in prosocial behavior increase as gender segregation in
occupational roles increases. However, it has to be noted that results
from some previous multinational studies are contrary to this assump-
tion. For example, gender differences in preferences (e.g., social and
risk preferences; Falk & Hermle, 2018) and basic values (e.g., power,
hedonism; Schwartz & Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009) were more pronounced
in countries that ranked high (rather than low) on gender equality.
Moreover, research has shown variation in the size of gender
differences in prosocial behavior (in a prisoner's dilemma game) across
different countries, without finding a systematic relationship between
gender differences and gender equality (as measured by the
Gender Inequality Index [GII]; http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/
gender-inequality-index-gii; Dorrough & Glöckner, 2019). Thus, it
seems especially important to shed light on the question of whether
or not gender segregation in the occupational domain influences gen-
der differences in prosocial behavior.
1.2 | The present research
The present research composes of two studies. In both Studies 1 and
2, we use an economic game to experimentally investigate whether
men and women engage in different kinds of prosocial behavior. Fur-
thermore, in Study 1, we test whether gender differences in
prosociality are influenced by a country's level of gender equality.
1.2.1 | Compensation/punishment game
One way to measure prosocial behavior in a standardized and con-
trolled way is through economic games. Economic games are widely
used by economists and psychologists in mononational as well as mul-
tinational studies (e.g., Dorrough & Glöckner, 2016; Romano
et al., 2017). One advantage of using economic games over self-report
is that economic games capture actual incentivized behaviors rather
than mere intentions that might be biased by social desirability (see
Camerer, 2003; Thielmann, Heck, & Hilbig, 2016). Economic games
model complex social interactions by concentrating on a few central
dependent variables and actual behavior. Games are conducted anon-
ymously and provide a consistent study environment for all partici-
pants. Thus, in contrast to field studies or other types of experiments,
economic games facilitate control over endogenous and exogenous
factors (Murnighan & Wang, 2016), ensuring internal validity. Eco-
nomic games are particularly suitable for multinational research as
they provide only minimal context information, reducing the threat of
poor cross-cultural validity. Furthermore, the anonymity of the game
interactions rules out potential confounds, such as the extent to
which participants perceive interaction partners to be attractive or
similar to themselves. In economic games, participants receive an ini-
tial endowment and are required to decide how much of that endow-
ment they would like to transfer to an interaction partner. The
present research employs a third-party compensation/punishment
game (e.g., Leliveld, Van Dijk, & Van Beest, 2012; Weng, Fox,
Hessenthaler, Stodola, & Davidson, 2015), which allows for two
potential prosocial behaviors. Specifically, participants observe that a
person receives an unfair monetary transfer from a third player. They
can then use their own monetary resources to compensate the victim
(i.e., the player who has received an unfair transfer) in the form of a
money transfer or to punish the perpetrator (i.e., the player who has
made the unfair transfer) by reducing their payoff. As the participant
has to sacrifice some of their own endowment without financial bene-
fit to compensate and punish, both behaviors are forms of prosocial
behavior (i.e., altruistic punishment and altruistic compensation; Fehr
& Fischbacher, 2003).
Communal behaviors involve empathy, caring for others, sociabil-
ity, and affection (e.g., Abele, Uchronski, & Suitner, 2008). We con-
sider compensation transfers to be a display of communal prosocial
behavior as these transfers are relational and comfort the victim. In
support of this claim, Weng et al. (2015) found in a com-
pensation/punishment game that empathic concerns promoted com-
pensation of a victim but not punishment of a perpetrator.
Agency is commonly associated with aggression, protectiveness,
and striving for power and status (e.g., Abele et al., 2008). Research
suggests that punishment transfers are a display of agentic prosocial
behavior. First, punishment is driven by spontaneous anger reactions
(Mischkowski, Glöckner, & Lewisch, 2018) and is often perceived as
an act of aggression by the punished person, leading to acts of
revenge (e.g., counter-punishment; Nikiforakis, 2008). Second, punish-
ment may result in behavioral change on the part of the perpetrator
(e.g., Glöckner, Kube, & Nicklisch, 2018), which prevents the perpetra-
tor from continuing to victimize others. As such, punishment may be
an act of protection because it communicates to perpetrators that
their behavior violates a norm, is not acceptable, and should be chan-
ged. Third, evidence indicates that punishment is related to power
and dominance: Participants who see themselves as more powerful
engage in more punishing transfers in different economic games
(Chierchia, Parianen Lesemann, Snower, Vogel, & Singer, 2017). Fur-
ther work demonstrates that participants make more punishment
transfers in economic games with unstable power hierarchies
(Dorrough, Glöckner, & Lee, 2017). These results show that the rele-
vant dimensions of agency are activated not only in direct interper-
sonal settings with long-term interactions but also in anonymous
economic games with short-term interactions. This might partially be
due to individuals overgeneralizing from social contexts to such games
(Rand et al., 2014).
In summary, in the present research, we consider compensation a
communal type of prosocial behavior and punishment an agentic type
of prosocial behavior. Our paradigm minimized additional motives for
third-party transfers such as demand characteristics and reputation by
ensuring that interactions were anonymous and that participants
interacted with their interaction partners only once and were not
directly affected by the unfair transfer. To the best of our knowledge,
our studies are the first to investigate gender differences in
prosociality by providing male and female participants with
a communal and an agentic behavioral option. Applying the
above-mentioned reasoning to game behavior, we hypothesize that
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men will make more punishment transfers (H1a), whereas women will
make more compensation transfers (H1b). We additionally
hypothesize that gender differences in compensation and punishment
transfers will increase as gender segregation in occupational roles
increases (H2).
2 | OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
The present research consists of two studies. In Study 1, participants
from 10 countries took part in the compensation/punishment game.
During the game, participants (who had been allocated to the role of
“Player E”) indicated decisions for transfers of Talers, which was the
experimental currency, to other players. Participants made a decision
after being informed about a fair transfer (where a player had trans-
ferred 50 out of 100 Talers1 to another player) and an unfair transfer
(where a player had transferred 0 out of 100 Talers to another player).
For each transfer, participants indicated how they would like to invest
their own endowment (50 Talers). Although participants were asked
to indicate decisions for transfers in response to fair and unfair behav-
ior, only the behavioral response for the unfair treatment is relevant
to our research questions, as we were only interested in prosocial
behavior (helping a person in need) elicited by the unfair condition.
Thus, only data from this scenario will be analyzed.2 Participants
could choose to spend their endowment by (a) keeping all of their
Talers to themselves, (b) transferring some or all of their Talers in the
form of punishment to the perpetrator (i.e., the player who behaved
unfairly), and/or (c) transferring some or all of their Talers in the form
of compensation to the victim (i.e., the player who was treated
unfairly). Participants were informed that Talers transferred as punish-
ment would reduce the perpetrator's experimental payoff, whereas
Talers transferred as compensation would increase the victim's experi-
mental payoff. To test our assumption that gender differences would
increase with (perceived) occupational gender segregation, partici-
pants indicated to what extent a range of agentic and communal occu-
pations were segregated by gender (see below).
To ensure the generalizability of our findings, Study 1 was con-
ducted not only in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and demo-
cratic (WEIRD; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) but also in non-
WEIRD countries such as Chile and Indonesia. Study 2 serves as a
conceptual replication of Study 1 but includes a more convenient stu-
dent sample from a single country (Germany). Our hypotheses were
preregistered on the Open Science Framework3 (Study 1, https://osf.
io/q5a4v/ Study 2, https://osf.io/p5vyk/). All data, analysis scripts,
and material files (English version) can be accessed at https://osf.io/
re7n3/. All translations of the scales can be accessed4 at https://osf.
io/7ybns/.
Study 1 was approved by the ethics committee of the University
of Göttingen and was conducted in accordance with the ethical
guidelines of the German Psychological Association (DGP) and the
American Psychological Association (APA). Study 2 was a conceptual
replication of Study 1 with only minor changes to the measures
and procedure.
3 | STUDY 1: SAMPLES FROM
10 COUNTRIES
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants and design
Data were collected in the summer of 2018. We employed a 10 (coun-
try) × 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) × 2 (victim gender: male
vs. female) mixed design with victim gender as a within-participant
factor. Participants were recruited via an online panel provider
(Toluna: https://de.toluna.com/). Our second hypothesis required suf-
ficient variance in gender segregation in occupational roles, so we
selected countries that varied in their rankings on the GII (http://hdr.
undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii), which is partly
determined by the proportion of women in the labor force. We used
data from 2017, which were the most recent data at the time of study
planning. For pragmatic reasons, we did not consider countries with
small Toluna panels (<50,000) or more than one official language
(e.g., Paraguay and Belgium). This procedure resulted in the selection
of the following countries (sorted by increasing gender equality): Indo-
nesia (GII rank 104 of 160), Colombia (rank 87), Mexico (rank 76),
Chile (rank 72), Russia (rank 53), the United States (rank 41), China
(rank 36), Japan (rank 22), Spain (rank 15), and Sweden (rank 3). In
each country, the sample was recruited to be representative of the
general population in terms of age and gender.
Study 1 is part of a larger project that collected data over two
time points (the data analyzed here were measured at the second time
point/Part 2).5 The a priori calculated sample size (n = 208 per coun-
try) was based on the design for the superordinate project using an
effect size estimate of d = 0.14 for gender differences in game behav-
ior (see Dorrough & Glöckner, 2019). To be able to detect small
effects, the required sample size was estimated at 200 participants
(for Players E, i.e., those who indicated decisions for compensation
and punishment transfers) with a desired power of 80%. This power
analysis was conducted with the use of G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007). For the analysis, we assumed a repeated
measures mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) as the closest prag-
matic approximation for the cluster-corrected regression analysis we
intended to run, as no convenient method for power estimation of the
latter analysis was available. We aimed to achieve this sample size in
each country. However, because of participant dropout, some coun-
tries have lower sample sizes. Thus, results for individual countries
must be interpreted with caution.
For the analyses, and as registered a priori on the Open Science
Framework, we included only participants who (a) completed both
Parts 1 and 2, (b) entered a valid participant code, and (c) indicated a
country of origin that corresponded to their country selection when
registering with the panel provider. From the final data set, we
excluded participants who indicated different countries of origin in
Parts 1 and 2 or who indicated a gender other than male or female
(n = 3). In addition, we excluded participants (n = 112) who were
(randomly) assigned to the role of “perpetrator” (Player C) or “victim”
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(Player D) rather than the role of interest (i.e., “observer”; Player E).
The final Player E sample is listed in Table 1. It has to be noted that
because of exclusion based on the above-mentioned criteria and
because of dropouts between Parts 1 and 2, some national subsam-
ples (for Players E) are smaller than originally planned. Sensitivity ana-
lyses assuming repeated measures mixed ANOVAs (see above) for the
different countries show that the effects that can be detected with
the available national samples (with a power of .80; alpha = .05) range
from d = 0.14 (Russia; n = 216) to d = 0.21 (the United States;
n = 114).
It took participants approximately 45 min to complete Parts 1 and
2. In addition to receiving a basic payment, participants received a
bonus payment that ranged from the equivalent of 0–4 US dollars and
that was based on one randomly selected incentivized task from Part
1 or 2. For example, the bonus payment could be based on one
decision in the compensation/punishment game by the participants
themselves (if they had been allocated to the role of Player E or C)
and/or their interaction partner(s). Participants' payment was first
calculated in “Talers,” which was converted to the respective national
currency for payout. The basic payment was credited to participants'
Toluna accounts directly after they completed the study. The bonus
payment, which depended on the decision of the participant and/or
their interaction partner(s), was calculated after study completion in
that we matched participants in groups of three according to their
player roles (one Player C, one Player D, and one Player E). The bonus
payment for these three players was determined by Player C's
transfer and the compensation and punishment decision of Player E
for this transfer. The bonus payment was credited to the participants'
Toluna accounts by theToluna project manager.
The study was translated from English into the language of each
subsample by a professional translation agency (https://www.e-kern.
com/). Thereafter, researchers in psychology (who were fluent in the
language of each translated survey) checked the translations against
the English version. If necessary, the surveys were sent back to the
translation company that considered the language edits made by the
researchers. The final versions were subsequently checked by a native
speaker; again, if necessary, minor changes were made following
their feedback.
3.1.2 | Materials and procedure
Participants first read information about data protection and details of
the study (i.e., duration and payment) and then provided informed
consent. At the beginning of the study (both in Parts 1 and 2), partici-
pants were informed about the calculation of their bonus payment.
Participants learned that they would receive a bonus payment based
on their answers and/or the answers of other participants in a ran-
domly selected task.
Gender segregation in occupational roles
Participants reported the proportion of men across a range of commu-
nal and agentic occupations in their country: “In your country, what
proportion (%) of individuals who work as [occupation] are male?” On
the basis of the previous research (Koenig & Eagly, 2014), we
assessed the perceived proportion of men across the following occu-
pations: nursery teachers, geriatric aides, nurses, secretaries, and ther-
apists (communal occupations) as well as police officers, attorneys,
CEOs, rescue service workers, soldiers, politicians, and judges (agentic
occupations).
Compensation/punishment game
Second, participants took part in the compensation/punishment game.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three different player
roles—C, D, or E. Only the decisions of Player E were relevant to the
hypothesis testing and analyzed. Even though data from Players C
and D were not required to test our hypotheses, a minority of partici-
pants were assigned to those roles (n = 112). Doing this allowed us to
calculate participants' bonus payments based on participants' actual
behaviors and thereby avoid deception in terms of how the bonus
payment was calculated.6 Player C had to decide how much of their
endowment of 100 Talers they wanted to transfer to the recipient
(Player D). The amount not transferred was kept by Player C. Player C
was reminded that the amount they kept might form the basis of their
bonus payment. Player C could transfer either 50 or 0 Talers to the
recipient (Player D). Player D had a passive role and could not make a
decision in the compensation/punishment game. Player E was
informed that they could transfer Talers as compensation to Person D
(which would increase Player D's payoff) and as punishment to Person
C (which would reduce Player C's payoff). Player E was asked to make
transfer decisions for two different scenarios (using a variant of the
strategy method): In the first scenario, Player E was asked how to
invest their Talers if Player C makes a fair transfer and sends 50 Talers
to Player D (“How much of your Talers do you want to transfer to
Person C and Person D if Person C keeps 50 Talers for herself [him-
self] and transfers 50 Talers to Person D?”). In the second scenario,
Player E was asked how to invest their Talers if Player C makes an
unfair transfer and sends 0 Talers to Player D (“How much of your
Talers do you want to transfer to Person C and Person D if Person C
TABLE 1 Subsamples in Study 1
Country N Age range in years % female
Chile 142 18–82 46
China 163 20–75 45
Colombia 184 18–71 52
Indonesia 174 18–69 56
Japan 204 20–81 50
Mexico 194 18–75 51
Russia 216 19–77 58
Spain 198 18–78 49
Sweden 202 18–86 53
United States 114 19–86 54
Note: This table shows the subsamples that entered our analyses. That is,
only Role E players are depicted in this table and considered in our power
considerations and sensitivity analyses.
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keeps 100 Talers for herself [himself] and transfers 0 Talers to Person
D?”). Only the latter (unfair) transfer was examined in our analyses.
For each of the two decisions, Player E received an endowment of
50 Talers and was asked to decide how to invest them. Player E could
divide their Talers by (a) keeping all of their Talers, (b) transferring
Talers in the form of punishment to Player C, and/or (c) transferring
Talers in the form of compensation to Person D. To make prosocial
behavior more profitable, Player E was informed that the Talers they
transferred as either punishment or compensation would be tripled by
the experimenter (for a similar approach, see Leliveld et al., 2012).
To avoid confounds because of cultural differences in how much
men and women interact with members of the opposite gender in
their daily lives, participants were informed that they were interacting
with players of the same gender. For exploratory analyses, we added
an additional round of the game in which participants were informed
that they were interacting with a victim (Player D) of the
opposite gender.
Following the procedure of previous multinational research
(Romano et al., 2017), we limited the amount of written information
and used pictorial instructions to illustrate the rules of the game (see
Figure 1 for an example). Participants were able to start the game
once they had correctly answered three comprehension questions
(e.g., “Person C transfers 0 Talers to Person D. How many Talers do
you have to transfer to Player D for them to receive 30 Talers as com-
pensation?”). At the end of the study, participants were provided with
contact information that they could use to request additional informa-
tion about the study.
3.2 | Results
As preregistered, for our main analyses, we only included data from
same-gender interactions (in which the gender of Player D matched
the gender of Player E; see reasoning for that decision above). Overall,
the descriptive results did not indicate that men and women engage
in different kinds of prosocial behavior (Figure 2). In fact, in all coun-
tries, men and women used punishment and compensation in a similar
manner (Figure S1) in that both men and women invested moreTalers
in compensation (men: M = 14.15, SD = 12.33; women: M = 13.22,
SD = 11.35) than in punishment (men: M = 9.05, SD = 10.34; women:
M = 8.61, SD = 9.48; see Table S1 for country level results). These
findings speak against our assumption of gender-typed prosociality.
In order to determine the statistical significance of gender differ-
ences (or lack thereof) across different prosocial behaviors, we ran an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis with cluster-corrected
standard errors at the participant level to account for dependencies in
error terms. Specifically, we predicted transfer behavior by prosocial
dimension (punishment vs. compensation) and participant gender
controlling for country differences by including country dummies. This
analysis did not reveal the hypothesized interaction between
participant gender and prosocial dimension (Table 2, Model 1).7
Predicting transfer behavior for the different dimensions separately
(punishment in Model 2; compensation in Model 3) to test H1a and
H1b more directly did not reveal significant effects of participant gen-
der.8 When including data from interaction partners of the opposite
gender and controlling for whether Player D had the same gender as
Player E (yes vs. no) in an exploratory analysis, the interaction
between participant gender and prosocial dimension remained
nonsignificant (b = −0.49, t(1790) = −0.80, p = .423). The three-way
interaction was also nonsignificant (b = 0.08, t(1790) = 0.11, p = .914).
Finally, analyses per country showed no significant interaction effect
between participant gender and prosocial dimension in any of the
10 countries (all p > .232). All these analyses speak for the robustness
of the null findings.
We predicted that gender differences in communal and agentic
prosocial behavior would increase as people perceived more gender
segregation in communal and agentic occupations (H2). We calculated
an index of gender segregation of labor by subtracting the perceived
proportion of men in communal occupations from the perceived pro-
portion of men in agentic occupations. The index could vary from
100 (100% men in agentic professions and 0% men in communal pro-
fessions) to −100 (0% men in agentic professions and 100% men in
communal professions). In line with Koenig and Eagly (2014), the
index of gender segregation of labor was positive (M = 24.73,
SD = 23.37), suggesting that participants perceived men as more likely
to hold agentic occupations than communal occupations. On average,
participants indicated that 68% (43%) of people working in agentic
(communal) professions were men. However, as expected, we found
F IGURE 1 This figure presents an
example illustration describing the
punishment rule of the
compensation/punishment game (i.e., if
Player E transfers 10 Talers in the form of
punishment to Player C, 30 Talers are
deducted from Player C's account)
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that the perceived segregation of labor varied across countries, from
M = 18.40 in Japan to M = 31.43 in Russia, which suggests that occu-
pations had a more equal distribution of women and men in some
countries than in others (for more details, see Froehlich, Olsson, Dorr-
ough, & Martiny, 2020). To test H2, we aggregated the division of
labor index at the country level. We then ran a multilevel regression
analysis predicting prosocial behavior by dimension (L1), participant
gender (L1), the interaction of dimension and participant gender, as
well as the cross-level interaction of the division of labor index
(L2) with the other predictors (group-mean centering used for Level
1 predictors, grand-mean centering used for the Level 2 predictor; see
Enders & Tofighi, 2007). The degree of between-participant and
between-country variability in the mean level of prosocial behavior is
captured by the Level 1 (SD intercept = 1.32, 95% CI [0.28, 6.28]) and
Level 2 (SD intercept = 0.28, 95% CI [0.03, 3.01]) random parameter
estimates of the intercept, respectively. The Level 2 random parame-
ter estimates of the division of labor index denote whether there is
between-country variability in gender differences in compensation
and punishment transfers (SD slope = 0.00, 95% CI [0.00, 2.83]). As
with the results reported above, we did not observe a simple effect
for participant gender, b = 0.43, z = 1.18, p = .238, but we did find a
significant effect of prosocial dimension on transfer, b = −4.45,
z = −12.57, p < .001. Contrary to H2, we did not observe the hypoth-
esized cross-level interaction, b = −0.03, z = −0.15, p = .882. We ran
an exploratory analysis where we replaced the gender segregation of
labor index with other indicators of gender equality. However, the
F IGURE 2 Prosocial behavior measured as
amount transferred by dimension (punishment
vs. compensation) and participant gender in
Study 1. Spikes represent 95% confidence
intervals based on cluster-corrected standard
errors. The p value refers to the interaction
between participant gender and dimension. A
graphical illustration for each country can be
found in Figure S1) [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 2 Transfer behavior in Study 1
(1) (2) (3)
Transfer 95% CI Transfer 95% CI Transfer 95% CI
Participant gender
(female = 0; male = 1)




−4.236*** (−9.12) [−5.15, −3.32]
Participant
gender * dimension
−0.445 (−0.62) [−1.84, 0.95]
Constant 13.19*** (35.87) [12.47, 13.91] 8.975*** (28.31) [8.35, 9.60] 13.17*** (35.10) [12.43, 13.90]
Observations 3,582 1,791 1,791
Participants/clusters 1,791 1,791 1,791
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.005 0.000
Note: Transfer behavior is predicted by participant gender, dimension, and their interaction (Model 1) as well as by gender for both dimensions separately
(punishment in Model 2 and compensation in Model 3). Country dummies are not reported. The table contains unstandardized coefficients. t statistics are
in parentheses.
***p < .001.
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conclusions regarding the interaction term remain unchanged when
using the 2018 GII (b = −4.66, z = −0.90, p = .368) and with women's
labor force participation as part of the GII (b = 0.05, z = 0.39,
p = .700).
3.3 | Discussion
Study 1 investigated whether women and men engage in different
kinds of prosocial behavior as a function of gender roles in the
occupational domain. In sum, data from Study 1 supported neither
the prediction of gender-differentiated prosociality (H1a and H1b)
nor the prediction of larger gender differences in countries that
have more (perceived) gender segregation in communal and agentic
occupations (H2). However, we found a substantial simple effect of
dimension (see Figure 2 and Table 2) in that participants,
irrespective of their gender, preferred to compensate rather
than punish.
Exploratory analyses revealed that the null findings replicated
when the victim was the opposite gender from the participant. One
potential limitation of Study 1 is that participants might have
perceived the punishment option as less attractive than the
compensation option. We observed an unexpected significant effect
of dimension, in that participants of both genders used an average of
4 Talers less (of an endowment of 50 Talers; ß = −0.19, p < .001) to
punish (i.e., engage in agentic prosocial behavior) than to compensate
(i.e., engage in communal prosocial behavior). Thus, we cannot exclude
the possibility that a potential gender difference was masked by the
fact that the punishment option was less attractive, and therefore,
both women and men made little use of it. To rule out this possibility,
we adapted our paradigm in two ways to make the punishment option
more attractive in Study 2.
4 | STUDY 2: STUDENT SAMPLE
REPLICATION
To test the robustness of the null effect concerning gender
differences in communal and agentic prosocial behavior, we
conducted a conceptual replication of Study 1 within a single cultural
context (Germany). Study 2 included some alterations to the
compensation/punishment game designed to increase the likelihood
of punishment being used. To reduce comparisons between the
compensation and the punishment transfer (which could lead to a
preference for the compensation transfer as a more socially accept-
able kind of prosocial behavior), participants in Study 2 were asked to
make decisions about punishment and compensation transfers in
separate rounds. We expected that this procedure would lead to a
higher use of the punishment option (for a similar procedure, see
Raihani & Bshary, 2015). In addition, the effectiveness of punishment
(i.e., the ratio with which punishment points reduced other players'
payoffs) was increased in one condition to make this behavioral
option more attractive.
4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants and design
Data of N = 193 participants (18–64 years of age, 51% female)9 were
collected in the on-site laboratory of the University of Cologne in
February 2019 using a 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) × 2 (pun-
ishment effectiveness: medium vs. high) × 3 (behavioral option: com-
pensation vs. punishment vs. both) × 2 (victim gender: male
vs. female) between-within design (the last two factors were varied
within participants). The sample size was based on the same power
calculations that informed the sample size for Study 1. Participants
received a basic payment of 3 Euros and a chocolate bar in exchange
for taking part in the study. Participants' bonus payment for the com-
pensation/punishment game was calculated in the same way as in
Study 1. Participants could pick up their bonus payment on two pre-
determined dates at different university locations. The study took
approximately 15 min to complete. After completing the study, the
Taler income was converted into Euros using a conversion rate of
100 Talers = 6 Euros. On average, participants earned 8.70 Euros
(approx. 9.80 US dollars) for participating in the study.
4.1.2 | Materials and procedure
Study 2 followed the same procedure as Study 1. The com-
pensation/punishment game in Study 2 was identical to the one in
Study 1 except for the changes described below. These changes were
implemented to allow for a strong test of gender-differentiated
prosocial behavior by increasing the overall use of punishment behav-
ior (in order to reduce potential bias toward compensation behavior).
The first change we implemented was separating the punishment and
compensation rounds (see Raihani & Bshary, 2015 for a similar proce-
dure) to prevent participants from comparing the relative value of
punishment and compensation (and therefore being more likely to opt
for the more socially desirable option, which would be compensation).
The second change we implemented was to add a second condition
with a higher efficiency of punishment to make this behavioral option
more attractive. In the medium punishment efficiency condition
(Condition 1), participants first played separate compensation and
punishment rounds (presented in randomized order). In the
compensation round, participants could only keep their Talers and/or
use them to compensate the victim. In the punishment round, partici-
pants could only keep their Talers and/or use them to punish the per-
petrator. Afterwards, participants played a round in which they could
use their Talers to keep, punish, and/or compensate (replicating the
design of Study 1). Punishment efficiency in all three rounds was the
same as in Study 1 (1:3). The second, high punishment efficiency
condition (Condition 2), which was implemented to make the
punishment transfer more attractive, followed the same procedure
with the exception that punishment efficiency was increased to 1:5
(i.e., each punishment Taler reduced the outcome of the other player
by a factor of 5).
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4.1.3 | Results
As in Study 1, only Player E's transfers in the unfair scenario were
analyzed.10 To achieve maximum power, choices from all three
rounds were included, that is, one punishment decision and one com-
pensation decision from the first two rounds as well as one punish-
ment and one compensation decision from the last round. The results
pointed in the expected direction, in that men were more inclined to
punish, whereas women were more inclined to compensate (see
Figure 3). Averaged across all rounds and conditions, men used slightly
fewer Talers for compensation (men: M = 12.37 [SD = 10.50]; women:
M = 12.97 [SD = 8.65]) and slightly more Talers for punishment (men:
M = 10.64 [SD = 10.53]; women: M = 9.07 [SD = 10.48]) compared
with women. Descriptive statistics for all rounds and conditions are
provided inTable S3.
In accordance with the preregistered analysis plan, we ran an OLS
regression with cluster-corrected standard errors at the participant
level predicting transfer by participant gender (female = 0; male = 1),
dimension (compensation = 0; punishment = 1), and their interaction.
We controlled for round (i.e., sequence), punishment efficiency, and
gender of Player D (different gender = 0; same gender = 1). We did
not find the hypothesized interaction between participant gender and
prosocial dimension (see Table 3, Model 4). This was also true when
we controlled for the two-way interactions between punishment effi-
ciency and gender, punishment efficiency and dimension, and the
three-way interaction (t = 1.52, p = .130). When predicting transfer
for the two dimensions separately (punishment in Model 5, compensa-
tion in Model 6) to directly test H1a and H1b, we did not observe sig-
nificant effects of participant gender on transfer.
When analyzing the medium punishment efficiency condition
(Table S2, Model 2) and the high punishment efficiency condition
(Table S2, Model 3) separately, no significant interaction effects were
observed. The replication condition (Table S2, Model 4) with medium
efficiency, in which participants could choose to use their Talers to
keep, compensate, and/or punish, also did not reveal an interaction
effect (see Table S3). When analyzing the punishment-only and
compensation-only rounds separately in this condition, women and
men did not differ with regard to their transfer behavior for punish-
ment (b = 3.59, p = .072) or for compensation; (b = 0.20, p = .906).
Although the simple effect of dimension was somewhat smaller than
in Study 1, we found that participants, irrespective of their gender,
preferred the communal prosocial behavior to the agentic prosocial
behavior option (seeTable 3).
For a maximally powerful test of our main hypotheses, we con-
ducted an overall analysis combining both studies (total N = 1,984)
predicting transfer by gender, dimension, and their interaction while
controlling for whether Player D (i.e., the victim) had the same gender
as the participant. Again, we did not find a significant interaction,
b = −0.01, t(1983) = −0.01, p = .990. A sensitivity analysis showed
that with this sample size, small effects (f = .10) could be detected
with a statistical power of .95.
5 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
This research tested the hypothesis that men and women engage in
qualitatively different prosocial behaviors. Eagly (2009) hypothesized
that because of gender roles in the labor market, women are inclined
to engage in communal (e.g., empathic, caring, sociable, and affection-
ate) forms of prosocial behavior, whereas men are inclined to engage
in agentic (e.g., aggressive, protective, and striving for power and sta-
tus) forms of prosocial behavior. On the basis of social role theory, we
also expected that gender differences would be particularly pro-
nounced in countries where men and women are perceived to be
unevenly distributed across communal and agentic occupations
(e.g., Eagly & Wood, 1999). The results of our studies did not support
either of our hypotheses. We did not find evidence for the hypothesis
that men and women engage in different kinds of prosocial behavior.
F IGURE 3 Gender differences in amounts
transferred by scenario (punishment
vs. compensation) in Study 2. Spikes represent
95% confidence intervals based on cluster-
corrected standard errors [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Contrary to our first hypothesis, in most countries, men do not seem
to be more likely than women to choose the agentic behavioral option
(see Table S1). Only in the US and the Chilean subsamples did we
observe a substantial difference between men and women in the
expected direction. Likewise, in none of the participating countries did
women seem to be more likely than men to choose the communal
behavioral option. In fact, our results suggest that both men and
women show a preference for communal over agentic prosocial
behavior. This seemed to be the case despite our efforts to maximize
the utility of punishment transfers in Study 2. One reason could be
that punishment, in contrast to compensation, results in an overall col-
lective loss, as the money used for punishment does not benefit any-
one in monetary terms. Contrary to our second hypothesis, we did
not find a relationship between gender differences in prosocial behav-
ior and gender roles in the labor market, as measured by the perceived
distribution of men and women in different communal and agentic
occupations. Moreover, gender differences in prosocial behavior did
not substantially vary across countries that ranked differently on gen-
der equality. Hence, our data speak against a robust effect of gender-
typed prosocial behavior that is contrary to social role theorizing and
previous research showing gender differences in economic prefer-
ences (e.g., Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Falk & Hermle, 2018) and in
prosocial transfer behavior (e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 1998;
Engel, 2011). Furthermore, contrary to previous research, our data did
not indicate a positive (Eagly & Wood, 1999) or negative (Falk &
Hermle, 2018) relationship between gender equality and gender dif-
ferences. Given these null findings, one should be cautious making
strong general claims concerning gender differences in prosocial
behavior. More differentiated perspectives are required.
5.1 | Potential reasons for null findings and future
directions
The overall null findings observed in our research could reflect the
fact that men and women do not differ in the kind of prosocial behav-
iors they engage in. This finding is in line with the gender similarity
hypothesis (Hyde, 2005) that men and women are psychologically
more similar than different and differ only in very few aspects
(e.g., motor behavior and physical aggression). It is also possible that
gender differences in prosocial behavior exist but that gender differ-
ences are very small and not very robust. To explore this, future
research could use multiple measures (instead of only one behavioral
measure) for the communal and the agentic prosocial domain. Multi-
ple measures would allow for aggregating behaviors in the respective
domains and may provide a more accurate estimate of gender differ-
ences by reducing noise in the data. To increase test power to detect
cross-level effects, future studies could test our predictions on a
larger sample (preferably 30–50 nations; Maas & Hox, 2005).
Another potential reason for the observed null findings is that
gender differences in prosocial behavior are very context sensitive
(see also Balliet et al., 2011 for a similar conclusion). One advantage
of using economic games is that only very little contextual information
is provided, which excludes potential confounding factors. However,
this can also be a disadvantage as we may inadvertently remove the
very factors that trigger gender differences in real life. Although in
Study 1, we did not find gender differences in the type of prosocial
behavior men and women engage in, there was a (non-significant)
trend in the predicted direction in Study 2. Specifically, women
tended to compensate the victim more than men, whereas men
TABLE 3 Transfer behavior in Study 2
(4) (5) (6)
Transfer 95% CI Transfer 95% CI Transfer 95% CI
Participant gender (female = 0;
male = 1)
−0.614 (−0.54) [−2.87, 1.64] 1.552 (1.21) [−0.98, 4.09] −0.610 (−0.53) [−2.86, 1.64]
Dimension (compensation = 0;
punishment = 1)
−3.042** (−2.88) [−5.12, −0.96]
Participant gender * dimension 2.169 (1.33) [−1.04, 5.38]
Round 1 2.614*** (4.08) [1.35, 3.878] 2.614*** (4.08) [1.35, 3.878]
Round 2 4.326*** (7.32) [3.16, 5.49] 4.326*** (7.32) [3.16, 5.49]
Punishment efficiency (medium
efficiency = 0; high efficiency = 1)
−1.152 (−1.27) [−2.93, 0.63] −1.381 (−1.07) [−3.91, 1.15] −0.923 (−0.81) [−3.17, 1.32]
Constant 11.41*** (14.03) [9.80, 13.01] 8.626*** (7.91) [6.478, 10.778] 11.15*** (13.09) [9.47, 12.83]
Observations 1,544 772 772
Participants/clusters 193 193 193
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.020 0.049
Note: Transfer behavior in Study 2 predicted by participant gender, dimension, and their interaction (Model 4) as well as by gender for both dimensions
separately (punishment in Model 5 and compensation in Model 6). Round dummies were included with Round 3 as the reference category. Effects of
Player D gender are omitted. The table contains unstandardized coefficients. t statistics are in parentheses.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
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tended to make more use of punishment than women did. Thus, it is
possible that gender differences in behavior are more pronounced in
lab studies (e.g., because of more direct interaction with the interac-
tion partners of both genders being in the same room), highly edu-
cated samples, or specific countries (e.g., more egalitarian countries;
Falk & Hermle, 2018). Furthermore, the compensation/punishment
game provides two behavioral options that differ with regard to only
one aspect (i.e., providing comfort vs. behaving in a more dominant
and aggressive manner). Future studies could test whether our find-
ings replicate when participants are provided with more contextual
information (e.g., more information about their interaction partners,
more information about the situation where help is required, such as
whether there are bystanders or not) and more behavioral options
that do not (only) concern monetary help as is the case in economic
games. For example, future research could assess gender differences
in prosocial behavior in the presence versus absence of a bystander
and toward a group versus an individual (Eagly, 2009). It is possible
that these factors may ignite gender differences in prosocial behavior
(Eagly, 2009). Furthermore, future research could investigate gender
differences across different settings, for example, in the
leisure/recreational domain as well as in the work domain. Identifying
moderating factors could generate knowledge about under which
conditions gender differences in behavior are likely to occur and thus
provide boundary conditions for the predictions of social role theory.
Finally, the null findings could be explained by the processes
expected to underlie the relationship between gender roles and
gender-differentiated behaviors. According to social role theory, the
observation of men and women in different social and occupational
roles leads to gender stereotypes, which in turn result in gender dif-
ferences in behavior, cognition, and affect. The relationship between
gender stereotypes and gender-differentiated outcomes is (among
other factors) mediated by social regulation (i.e., adhering to the
expectations other people have of men and women; Eagly &
Wood, 2012). This means that even if people observe gender segrega-
tion, this may not necessarily affect their own behavior if they are not
motivated to adhere to these expectations. Future research could
include measures of participants' expectations regarding men's and
women's prosociality and the degree to which they are motivated to
act in accordance with these expectations. This could also add to
knowledge about the generalizability of social role theory.
5.2 | Strengths and limitations
In the current research, we addressed the hypothesis that men and
women engage in qualitatively different prosocial behavior using a
highly controlled economic game paradigm. Economic games offer
several advantages (e.g., actual behavior is measured; potentially con-
founding factors, such as reputation concerns, are precluded), espe-
cially in a cross-national context (because of high cross-cultural
validity). We included both WEIRD and non-WEIRD subsamples in
Study 1 and a convenient student sample in Study 2 to ensure the
generalizability of our findings. To the best of our knowledge, this
research is the first that has experimentally investigated gender differ-
ences in prosociality by providing male and female participants with a
communal and an agentic behavioral option in response to observing
unfair treatment (i.e., a situation where prosocial behavior is
warranted). Furthermore, by sampling from countries in Study 1 that
varied in inequality according to the GII (http://hdr.undp.org/en/
content/gender-inequality-index-gii), we provided a comprehensive
comparison of gender differences in prosocial behavior across coun-
tries that vary in gender segregation in occupational roles. Despite
some strengths, the present research has several limitations that we
outline below for future researchers to consider. One potentially sub-
optimal design feature in the present research is that participant gen-
der might have become salient prior to/when interacting with other
players in the compensation/punishment game. In Study 1, partici-
pants were asked to estimate the proportion of men in different occu-
pations before taking part in the economic game. Moreover, in both
studies, the gender of the victim was manipulated within participants
such that participants always interacted with a same-gender victim
before interacting with an opposite-gender victim. These design fea-
tures may have made the purpose of the study fairly obvious, which
in turn may have resulted in demand effects (Nichols & Maner, 2008).
However, for various reasons, we think that it is unlikely that our null
findings are due to demand effects. First, the study involved real
incentives, and behavior in line with demands would have been costly
and less likely than in merely hypothetical studies. Second, at the end
of Study 1 (Study 2), only 1.7% (4.1%) of participants made a gender-
related comment in their feedback on the study, which suggests that
participants were not aware they were participating in a study on gen-
der differences. It should be noted, however, that we did not explicitly
ask participants to speculate about the purpose of the study. Anyhow,
previous research shows that when group identities are made salient,
participants are more likely to show attitudes (e.g., Steele &
Ambady, 2006) and behavior (e.g., Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999)
consistent with stereotypes for this group. Thus, it can be argued that
making gender salient should have increased rather than suppressed
gender differences. The fact that we did not find gender differences
despite potentially making gender salient speaks in favor of the null
hypothesis. Nevertheless, future studies may opt to pose gender-
related questions after participants have completed the economic
game or at a separate time point. Additionally, future research could
assess transfer behavior toward other players that have not had their
gender specified.
Another potential limitation of the present research is that it did
not include simultaneous, direct interactions between players. Instead,
participants indicated transfer behavior for various scenarios (i.e., the
perpetrator makes a fair vs. unfair transfer) using a variant of the strat-
egy method (i.e., participants indicate decisions/their strategy for dif-
ferent roles or scenarios), which is widely used in economic and
psychological research. It was only after study completion that partici-
pants were matched with other participants in the study and their
bonus payment was calculated based on their behavior and/or the
behavior of their interaction partner(s). Brandts and Charness (2011)
compared the use of the direct response (i.e., participants interact
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with each other in real time) with the strategy method
(i.e., participants indicate decisions for different scenarios) in eco-
nomic games. They concluded that whereas the behavior of the per-
son that makes the first decision (e.g., the trustor in the trust game) is
very similar across both methods, the behavior of the person who acts
in reaction to the behavior of other people (e.g., the punisher or
trustee in a trust game) can differ. The authors argue that the differ-
ence stems from emotional responses that should be stronger in “hot”
(i.e., direct) as compared to “cold” (i.e., strategy method) decisions.
This could explain why the employment of the strategy method
(vs. direct response) does not seem to influence third party punishers
who make punishment decisions in reaction to observed behavior
(Jordan, McAuliffe, & Rand, 2016), a finding especially relevant to the
present research. However, whether this is also the case for third-
party compensation and whether these differences are moderated by
participant gender are open questions that should be addressed in
future research. Using a direct response method in future studies has
the additional advantage that participants might be less skeptical as to
whether they are actually interacting with other participants, which
may have influenced their transfer behavior. Although we could not
find any indication of such skepticism in the feedback participants
provided at the end of the survey, we cannot completely rule out that
participants treated the compensation/punishment game as a hypo-
thetical interaction making our monetary incentivization ineffective.
5.3 | Conclusion
On the basis of the findings from Studies 1 and 2, we conclude that
gender differences in communal and agentic prosocial behavior—if they
exist at all—are small and not robust, in line with the similarity hypothe-
sis that men and women are more similar than different (Hyde, 2005).
According to our a priori power analysis, our sample sizes were large
enough to detect small to medium effects. Future studies could
increase statistical power in order to detect very small gender differ-
ences in behavior. This is especially relevant given that the majority of
gender differences in the cognitive and social domain are in the close-
to-zero or small range (Hyde, 2005). Furthermore, future studies could
enrich the context and add additional measures of agentic and commu-
nal prosocial behavior. On the basis of our results, one should be careful
not to make strong claims concerning gender differences in the usage
of different kinds of prosocial behavior. Such claims might cause harm
in reinforcing perceptions that persons of a specific gender are unfit for
specific occupations (lack of fit model; e.g., Heilman, 1983; Heilman &
Caleo, 2018). Specifically, women might be given fewer opportunities
to enter high-status positions (Heilman & Caleo, 2018) where an
agentic form of prosociality is expected. On the other hand, men might
be disadvantaged in care-giving jobs (e.g., Cejka & Eagly, 1999) where a
communal form of prosocial behavior is expected. Furthermore, the
expectation of large gender differences can induce self-esteem prob-
lems and influence couple communication and conflict (for a discussion,
see Hyde, 2005). In sum, on the basis of our research presented in this
article, we conclude that men and women do not substantially differ
concerning the type of prosocial behavior they show in economic
games. Further research is needed to assess gender-typed prosociality
in other domains and contexts.
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ENDNOTES
1 100 Talers = 100 US cents.
2 Recording participants' responses following the fair transfer was
required for the calculation of their bonus payment.
3 For Study 1, additional hypotheses for behavioral intentions were speci-
fied. These hypotheses are discussed in a manuscript available from the
authors upon request.
4 The translation of other measures belonging to different projects are
also provided here.
5 In Part 1, we recorded participants' social and risk preferences. Part
1 also included some items of the World Value Survey. In Part 2, we
recorded participants' transfer behavior in a prisoner's dilemma game
and behavioral intentions in the work context. Because participants did
not receive feedback during the study, we did not expect carry-over
effects from Study 1 to the compensation/punishment game.
6 The number of participants in a given country that received a bonus pay-
ment dependent on behavior in the compensation/punishment game
was determined by the player role with the smallest number of partici-
pants. For example, if we had 10, 15, and 163 participants allocated to
Roles C, D, and E, respectively, 10 participants in each player role
received a bonus payment dependent on their and/or their interaction
partners' decision(s) in the compensation/punishment game. All other
participants from this country received a bonus payment dependent on
another randomly determined incentivized task from Part 1 or 2. The
participants whose payment was determined by the com-
pensation/punishment game were matched (each Player E was matched
with one Player C and one Player D). Depending on Player C's decision,
the bonus payment was calculated. For example, if Player C made a fair
transfer, Player E's decision for a fair transfer was used. To give a further
example, if player C chose an unfair transfer of 0 and Player E decided
to transfer 0 Talers in the form of punishment to Player C and 10 Talers
in the form of compensation to Person D, Player C received a bonus
payment of 100 Talers, Player D received a bonus payment of 3 * 10
Talers (the compensation), and Player E received a bonus payment of
40 Talers (50–10 Talers).
7 A multilevel linear random effects regression with two levels (participant
and country level) and random intercepts predicting transfer by partici-
pant gender, prosocial dimension, and their interaction (both variables
group-mean centered) led to the same conclusion (b = −0.47, z = −0.65,
p = .513, for the interaction).
8 In the preregistration of Study 1, we specified a slightly different
approach. Rather than absolute transfers, we planned to use transfers
relative to the overall amount that people transferred. When using this
index instead of the absolute values, conclusions remain unchanged.
12 DORROUGH ET AL.
9 One participant indicated a gender different from male or female. Three
participants stated an age <18. These participants were excluded from
the analyses.
10 In contrast to Study 1 and to achieve more observations per participant,
we preregistered that we would include decisions for interaction part-
ners of the opposite gender and control for this factor in the analyses.
Results were unchanged when we restricted the models reported in
Table 2 to interactions with the same gender.
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